SSHole: OpenSSH Authentication Bypass Is Being Exploited on Alpine and musl-Based Linux Servers, What to Do
SSHole (CVE-2026-123158), fixed in OpenSSH 10.6p2, bypasses password authentication for some accounts on systems using musl libc, such as Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot and Yocto. Real exploitation was seen about 40 hours after the fix.
In brief: CVE-2026-123158, nicknamed SSHole, is a high-severity authentication bypass in OpenSSH. It was reported by security researcher Ozgun Kultekin and fixed on 5 November 2026 in OpenSSH 10.6p2. According to SecurityWeek it affects Linux distributions that use musl libc with PAM disabled (Alpine, Buildroot, OpenWrt, Yocto): on accounts whose password hash is
*, a 257 to 1,024-character password can pass authentication. BleepingComputer reports a proof of concept about four hours after the fix and the first successful in-the-wild exploitation, recorded by GreyNoise at 00:46 UTC on 7 November, roughly 40 hours later. So far botnet and cryptomining activity is reported. What to do: upgrade to 10.6p2 or later, or disable SSH password authentication. This article is based on BleepingComputer and SecurityWeek reports (9 November 2026).
Last updated: 9 November 2026
How does the flaw work?
On some Linux accounts that are not meant to log in with a password (key-only users, accounts never given a password), the password field is stored as *. Normally that means “no password login for this account.”
According to the reports, the problem is this: for such an account, sshd borrows another account's salt. When the password is longer than 256 bytes, musl's crypt() returns * on error instead of NULL. OpenSSH treats that * as a match against the account's stored *, and the door opens. Accounts with a valid password hash are not affected.
Who is affected?
According to SecurityWeek:
- OpenSSH sshd on Linux distributions using musl libc with PAM disabled: Alpine, Buildroot, OpenWrt, Yocto.
- Risky Alpine accounts: root, key-only users created with
adduserwithout a password, the alpine user in official tiny-cloud images, and users from directory services via musl-nscd. - The SecurityWeek report does not state the affected OpenSSH version range; treat versions before 10.6p2 as affected and check your distribution's advisory.
Typical cases in scope: VPSs running Alpine, Alpine-based cloud images, embedded devices and OpenWrt routers. Most Docker containers do not run sshd; if yours includes an SSH server, this section applies to you.
BleepingComputer adds that if the compromised account has passwordless administrative privileges, the attacker can obtain root access.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 5 November | OpenSSH 10.6p2 released; a proof of concept appeared about four hours later and exploitation attempts began |
| 6 November | Successful exploitation recorded; watchTowr reported botnet and cryptomining activity; Previdian saw first attempts |
| 7 November, 00:46 UTC | GreyNoise recorded the first successful in-the-wild exploitation (about 40 hours after the fix) |
| 8 November | Previdian's last observation: 20 attempts from 13 IP addresses in nine countries |
| 9 November | BleepingComputer and SecurityWeek reports |
What was seen in the attacks?
- GreyNoise: 16 successful exploitation chains from six source IPs against networks it protects. Attackers did reconnaissance, queried cloud metadata services, tried to read password hashes and root SSH keys, and tried to modify
authorized_keys. One attacker gained root and installed “TAC Agent,” a Python command-and-control agent; it could not reach its server and never received a task. - Previdian: 20 attempts from 13 IPs in nine countries.
- Defused: a “small amount of actors” with low activity.
Limits worth noting: GreyNoise says its 16 chains are not representative of all SSHole activity. Its separate figures of 27.5 million port-22 scans and 20.1 million attempted SSH sessions are not confirmed SSHole attacks. Chinese-language comments and logs in the agent can be used with other evidence when assessing origin, but they are not conclusive on their own.
What to do: 6 steps
- Identify your distribution:
cat /etc/os-releaseand the libc type (Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto use musl). glibc-based systems such as Debian, Ubuntu and RHEL are not mentioned in these reports. - Upgrade: OpenSSH 10.6p2 or later; Alpine's advisory says to apply the patch and restart
sshd. - If you can't upgrade, set
PasswordAuthentication noinsshd_config(move to key-based login) or block access to SSH. - Review logs: look for unexpected successful password logins on accounts whose password field in
/etc/shadowis*. - Look for signs of compromise: unfamiliar
authorized_keysentries, TAC Agent files, new startup services and unusual CPU use (mining). - Reduce SSH exposure: access only through a VPN or bastion, IP restrictions and, where possible, not exposing the default port 22.
If you find a suspected compromise, don't stop at patching: rotate access keys and any secrets on the server, and consider rebuilding the server from a clean install.
What does this episode teach us?
The time from patch to exploitation is measured in hours, not days: four hours to a proof of concept, about 40 to real exploitation. We saw similar speed with PHP2Shell. A “weekly patch window” may no longer be enough for critical, internet-facing services. For prioritisation logic see our patch management article and our Microsoft patch article.
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We support server configuration, access security and regular patching. To have your current infrastructure reviewed, use our quote form. Related services: web applications. To define maintenance responsibilities, see our maintenance and SLA guide.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is my Ubuntu or Debian server affected?
The reports tie the flaw to systems using musl libc; Ubuntu and Debian use glibc and are not mentioned. Still keep OpenSSH current and follow your distribution's security advisories.
I log in with an SSH key. Is there a risk?
The risk concerns accounts whose password hash is * while password authentication is enabled. Even if you use keys, those accounts can be exposed if PasswordAuthentication is on. Turning password authentication off removes the risk.
Is my Docker container affected?
If no sshd runs in the container, the flaw does not apply. If you run an SSH server in an Alpine-based image, rebuild the image.
Does exploitation leave a lasting footprint?
Observed attacks involved authorized_keys changes, agent installation and cryptomining. If in doubt, rebuilding the server from a clean install is the safest route.
Are the attacks automated?
The report says some attacks may be partly automated (for example a missing tool check returning feedback an automated planner could use). That is an inference, not firm proof.
Conclusion
SSHole shows that accounts you think are “passwordless” can be opened with a password on certain systems. If you run Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot or Yocto, move to OpenSSH 10.6p2 or turn off password authentication. The first step: list your internet-facing servers and confirm each one's distribution and OpenSSH version in writing.
